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Executive Summary
Gorana Krstic´, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsic´,
Branko Radulovic´, Sasˇa Ranđelovic´, and Irena Jankovic´
10.1 Main Findings of the Study
10.1.1 Survey of the Informal Activities of Serbian
Businesses and Entrepreneurs
Incentives to formalise the shadow economy should be based on knowledge of the
causes and structure of informal activity. A specific problem in designing these
incentives is the fact that information on the shadow economy is inherently
unreliable and incomplete. A survey of the informal activities of Serbian businesses
and entrepreneurs (Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia) was
therefore carried out for the purpose of this study on a representative sample of
1,251 business entities (businesses and entrepreneurs). This made it possible for the
first time to view the Serbian shadow economy from the point of view of businesses,
to assess the various forms that the shadow economy takes, and to analyse them
according to the relevant characteristics of business entities. The survey also
allowed us to see the causes of and motives for informal activity, which is of
particular importance in drafting recommendations for formalising the shadow
economy.
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10.1.2 Causes of the Shadow Economy
We analysed the causes of the shadow economy using elementary theoretical
analysis, comparative data, social partners’ views on how institutions operate,
and the results of the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia. Among
the fiscal causes of the shadow economy are the relatively high fiscal burden on
labour; complicated and costly tax procedures; complicated and opaque tax system;
poorly organised, under-staffed, and under-equipped Tax administration; poor
quality of public services; and high tolerance for the shadow economy. The features
of the labour market that are particularly significant in fostering and sustaining the
shadow economy are high fiscal burden on labour for lower wage earners; a social
security system that prevents entitlement to social welfare benefits and other trans-
fers for people in formal employment; high minimum wage; and certain regulations
governing employment protection legislation, working hours, unemployment ben-
efits, and the pension system. There are many other institutional and economic
factors that contribute to the large extent of the shadow economy. Owing to low
productivity, many businesses can only operate at a profit if they evade paying
taxes. The economic crisis and pervasive liquidity issues have forced even the more
productive businesses to shift a portion of their operations into the informal sector,
and inefficient enforcement and market exit mechanisms incentivise businesses
operating in the informal sector to remain there. Among the other causes with a
significant bearing on the extent of the shadow economy are high administrative
burdens on doing business; low quality of the regulatory environment; and legal
insecurity. In addition to these regulatory causes the decision to operate informally
is affected by widespread corruption and low tax morality. The most important
financial factors are the large share of cash transactions in the total volume of
payments, informal financing, and the unregistered remittances of migrant workers.
10.1.3 Extent of the Shadow Economy in Serbia
The shadow economy in Serbia was estimated using three methods: (a) the MIMIC
method, a modelling-based approach covering Serbia and ten other Central and
Eastern European countries between 2001 and 2010; (b) the Household Tax Com-
pliance (HTC) method based on 2010 data for Serbia, an indirect method based on
macroeconomic data; and (c) the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia. The methods used differ in their coverage of the shadow economy in
terms of institutional sector, form of shadow economy, and methodology used.
The MIMIC method has the broadest coverage since it covers all institutional
sectors and all forms of the shadow economy. The HTC method estimates only
those forms of the shadow economy that can be identified and estimated on the basis
of household income and consumption data. The survey was used to estimate the
most important forms of the shadow economy among business entities.
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The results of the assessment using the first method showed that all countries
recorded a decline in the extent of the shadow economy over the observed period,
with the exception of 2009 when there was a slight increase. In Serbia the shadow
economy contracted from 33.2 % of official GDP in 2001 to 30.1 % in 2010
(Table 10.1). The results show that the shadow economy in Serbia (as % of GDP)
declined over the period of economic growth and remained nearly unchanged after
the beginning of the economic downturn. Serbia’s levels were greater than the
averages for the other selected 11 countries throughout the entire reporting period.
Only Bulgaria had a larger shadow economy, as a percentage of GDP, than Serbia.
The HTC method estimated the extent of the shadow economy in Serbia at 24 %
of GDP. The figure obtained using the HTC method is lower than that derived from
using the MIMIC model, since data on household income and consumption cannot
cover some forms of the shadow economy in the business sector (corporate income
and property tax, charges, fees, etc.).
Data from the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia made it
possible to estimate the extent of the two key forms of informal activity in the
sectors of businesses and entrepreneurs, trade in goods, and partly or wholly
unreported employment. Using the findings of the survey we estimated that these
two forms of informal activity amount to some 21 % of GDP. The extent of the
shadow economy estimated using the results of the survey is the lowest, since
businesses also take part in the shadow economy by evading the payment of other
dues such as corporate income tax, property tax, fees, and charges, and there is also
a portion of the shadow economy that takes place outside the business sector (home
repairs, private tuition, trade in goods at flea markets, etc.). A comparison of these
results with those obtained using the MIMIC method showed that businesses and
entrepreneurs accounted for over two-thirds of all activity in the shadow economy,
and that these were in the form of illicit transactions and the payment of wages
without paying appropriate taxes and contributions.
10.1.4 Estimates of the Tax Evasion Gap
The tax gap is the difference between hypothetical (theoretical) tax revenue and
taxes actually collected. Hypothetical tax revenues are the sums that would be
collected over a particular period of time if all taxpayers paid their taxes in full
compliance with tax legislation. The shadow economy is a broader concept than the
Table 10.1 Extent of the shadow economy according to the various methods of estimation
Year % of GDP
Shadow economy according to the MIMIC method 2010 30.1
Shadow economy—HTC method 2010 23.6
Shadow economy—Survey 2012 21.0
Source: Own calculations
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tax gap, as it encompasses all taxable economic activities that take place informally.
The tax gap, on the other hand, is the amount of tax that should be paid on those
activities. The tax gap is mainly caused by tax evasion, which is why these two
terms are often seen as identical. However, the tax gap can, to a lesser extent, reflect
reported but unpaid taxes, as well as tax revenue lost due to taxpayer bankruptcy,
write-offs of back taxes, etc. Having carried out a detailed analysis of tax rates,
volumes of consumption, etc., we estimated the VAT gap at 2.5 % of GDP
(Table 10.2). By combining the data from macroeconomic accounts with the
findings of the survey, we estimated the tax gap for personal income tax and social
security contributions at about 5 % of GDP. We then extrapolated these tax gap
estimates to all taxes, and by using data from the Household Consumption Survey
we arrived at the figure of 10 % as an approximation of the overall tax gap.
10.1.5 The Shadow Economy in the Business
and Entrepreneur Sector
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia asked respondents to state
their views on whether their own business was engaged in the shadow economy,
and found that 28 % of all business entities in Serbia did so. These businesses and
entrepreneurs employed workers informally and/or made payments in cash even
Table 10.2 Estimated tax gap and fiscal effects of formalisation
Method/
coverage Year Amount








Personal income tax and social contributions gap
(as % of GDP)
Survey 2010 5.0
Personal income tax and social contributions gap
(as % of hypothetical income tax and contributions)
Survey 2010 27.7
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though they were VAT payers. The term ‘informal workers’ is used to describe
workers employed without a contract or those who do have contracts but only
declare part of their wage officially, with the remainder paid in cash. The results of
the survey show that entrepreneurs, new start-ups, construction businesses and
businesses based in Central Serbia are more likely to engage in the shadow
economy. Based on respondents’ views on the participation of their own businesses
in the shadow economy and their estimates of the extent to which other entities in
the same industry take part in informal activities, we estimated the upper and lower
limit of the extent of the shadow economy in this sector. The share of employees
working without formal contracts ranged from 1.9 % (lower limit) to 23.9 % (upper
limit) of the total number of employees. The share of employees with a portion of
undeclared wages ranged between 3.8 and 24.7 %, while the share of cash trans-
actions ranged between 11.3 and 21.6 % of the total volume of payments.
Econometric analysis based on the survey data identified specific factors that are
statistically significant to a business’s decision whether or not to engage in informal
operations. The results obtained were in line with the findings of other studies,
where entrepreneurs were seen to be more likely to take part in the shadow
economy than other business entities. Business entities in the construction sector
were almost twice as likely to operate informally than those in services, while
entities in the trade sector were nearly twice less likely to do so. Finally, the attitude
of the business entity towards the shadow economy was a major and statistically
significant factor determining that entity’s participation in the shadow economy.
The findings of the survey showed that competition from entities operating at
least partly in the informal sector was extremely widespread. As many as 85.3 % of
the business entities surveyed stated that unfair competition was present in their
sector of economic activity. Construction and transportation again led the field,
whilst the presence of competition was also determined to a large degree by the
likelihood of detection. This shows that most problems appear in sectors where
there are greater regulatory obstacles to formalisation and greater difficulty in
detecting informally employed workers. Since such an environment is conducive
to greater operating savings, the pressure of competition coming from the informal
sector is thus also greater.
10.1.6 Effects of Formalising the Shadow Economy
Although the estimated extent of the shadow economy in Serbia is significant,
comparative data show that the average is only about 5 percentage points greater in
Serbia than in other Central and Eastern European countries. This leads to the
conclusion that the tax gap in Serbia is greater by approximately the same amount
as in these other countries. Therefore the optimal aim in reducing the extent of the
shadow economy and the tax gap in Serbia would be to reduce them to the Central
and Eastern European averages over the medium term, while the long-term goal
would be to bring them down to the levels seen in developed Western European
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countries. The potential increase in public revenue that could be generated by
reducing the Serbian shadow economy was estimated at between 0.8 and 1.1 %
of GDP in the medium term (up to 3 years), or some 2 % of GDP in the long term
(7–10 years).
These estimates are the upper limit of the potential additional public revenue that
could be generated through the reduction of the shadow economy, since the
institutional conditions for tackling the shadow economy and tax morality are far
higher in Western European countries than in Serbia as a consequence of their long
tradition of combating the shadow economy. These fiscal effects can only be
achieved in Serbia if all the measures necessary to tackle the shadow economy
are applied in a comprehensive, non-selective, and consistent manner. From the
fiscal policy standpoint, a reduction in the shadow economy will not allow for any
tax cuts or greater public expenditure. Taxing the shadow economy should con-
tribute to a drop in the fiscal deficit and compensate for the decline in tax revenues
due to the expected restructuring of the economy towards less-taxable activities
such as exports and investment.
The findings of the MIMIC method applied to Serbia and the other 10 Central
and Eastern European countries show that the effect of the shadow economy on
registered GDP is statistically highly significant and has the expected negative sign:
if GDP per capita falls by 1 percentage point, the shadow economy will increase by
between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points, depending on the model used. This means
that any future decline in GDP will increase pressure on the shadow economy, since
business entities will endeavour to compensate for fewer opportunities in the formal
sector by shifting into the shadow economy. This finding underlines the importance
of preserving macroeconomic stability and creating conditions for future growth in
the future, which will be a major component in the successful strategy for
formalising the shadow economy.
10.2 Recommendations for Formalising the Shadow
Economy
10.2.1 Fiscal Policy Measures
Fiscal policy measures are aimed at reducing incentives for operating in the shadow
economy and the benefits of doing so on the one hand, and increasing the associated
costs and risks on the other. The most important fiscal policy measures for tackling
the shadow economy are: reducing distortions introduced by the tax system;
reducing tax compliance costs; reducing the return to tax evasion; and reducing
tolerance for the shadow economy.
Distortions introduced by taxes in Serbia could be reduced by decreasing the
fiscal burden on labour (since other general taxes are moderate), by reducing the
number of tax rates applicable to income from different sources or trade in different
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types of goods, and by significantly reducing the number of tax exemptions
(particularly when it comes to corporate income tax). Tax compliance costs could
be lowered by reducing the number of tax procedures and simplifying them, and by
introducing mandatory e-filing of tax returns and requiring electronic communica-
tion with tax authorities. Thus, the reduction in cost effectiveness of tax evasion
could be achieved primarily by increasing the likelihood of the Tax Administration
detecting tax evasion: to ensure this, the number of Tax Administration staff tasked
with performing audits should be increased, and their training and case selection
methodology improved. In addition, there should be more consistent implementa-
tion of statutory penalties for tax evasion, particularly by courts.
Moreover, there should be co-operation with other government bodies (such as
the Municipal Police) to institute and enforce a ban on the sale of new products at
farmers’ and flea markets. Improving co-ordination between the Tax Administra-
tion and other government bodies, both in terms of exchange of information and of
joint action in the field, is another important precondition for tackling the shadow
economy and combatting tax evasion. The reach of property taxes should be
widened in co-operation with the Property Cadastre and other government bodies,
since a significant percentage of properties in Serbia are unregistered and as such
not subject to property tax. Co-operation between the Tax Administration and other
government bodies is of particular importance in successfully cross checking
property and income, which would project a public message of the state’s determi-
nation to tackle the shadow economy and the tax evasion associated with it. In order
to combat the non-payment of taxes, the practice of periodically writing off nominal
interest on back taxes should be finally abandoned. A portion of the principal debt is
also written off along with nominal interest, which rewards undisciplined taxpayers
and fosters moral hazard behaviour, as taxpayers will intentionally defer payment in
expectation of a new round of interest write-offs.
Finally, in order to reduce the extent of the shadow economy, the education and
public information system must be used to increase public awareness of the adverse
effects of the shadow economy and so improve tax morality. An improvement in the
quality of public goods and services provided by the state would also contribute to
achieving this goal.
10.2.2 Measures Relating to Features of the Labour Market
In terms of the fiscal burden on labour, the tax wedge of labour (expressed as the
ratio of total wage taxes and contributions to total labour costs) is high for low
wages and relatively low for high wages, a consequence of the proportional wage
taxation system with a relatively low tax-exempt allowance. At about the level of
the minimum wage, the tax burden in Serbia is the fourth highest of all European
countries. This is a natural incentive for the preservation and growth of informal
employment, since informal businesses generally enter the formal economy at
approximately that point. Thus, the most important recommendation in the field
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of labour taxation is the need to substantially reduce labour costs for lower-paying
jobs. Any kind of reform of labour taxation (or, in a broader sense, of the taxation of
income derived from work) should ideally entail an increase in the personal
tax-exempt allowance to the level of the minimum wage. Most European countries
employ this practice. In addition, introducing a tax exempt allowance for depen-
dents would reduce the tax wedge for employees with unemployed spouses and
children, and thereby reduce their incentives for joining the shadow economy.
The existence of the minimum social security contribution base makes open-
ended, full-time labour contracts unpopular. Another means of reducing the tax
wedge for lower wages would be to remove the minimum social security base,
which now stands at 35 % of the average wage. While its impact on people working
full-time jobs is negligible, since the minimum wage is far above this level, it
increases labour costs for part-time workers with standard open-ended employment
contracts. An important incentive for formalising informal employees working
part-time jobs could be the introduction of less restrictive tax treatment of ‘mini
jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’, based on the positive experiences of Germany where, for mini
jobs, healthcare and social security contributions are much lower than standard,
while the rate of income tax can even equal zero. Midi jobs attract contributions that
are greater than those for mini jobs but still lower than standard, so that workers in
mini jobs can avoid the trap of in-work poverty, and their transition into standard
employment is eased.
Welfare benefits in Serbian practice are available almost exclusively to unem-
ployed and inactive persons, which encourage those who are able to work to
combine welfare and informal employment. To incentivise employment in the
formal sector, an in-work benefits programme should be introduced along the
lines of the US Earned Income Tax Credit, which would make it possible for
workers to combine formal employment and welfare benefits, with the latter
gradually reduced as earnings increase.
To avoid driving down demand for formal work, the minimum wage should be
reduced from the current level of 50 % to some 35–40 % of the average wage, as
used to be the case in Serbia until several years ago and as recommended by the
World Bank for middle-developed countries. Moreover, the introduction of a
slightly lower minimum wage for under-25 s should be considered in order to
stimulate their open-ended employment. Similarly, the minimum wage could vary
slightly by region so as to partly reflect regional variation in the cost of living.
The most urgent requirement in the area of employment protection legislation is
the removal of the statutory provision obliging employers to pay employees
severance in proportion to each employee’s total years of service rather than only
years of service spent with their current employer. This would foster formal
employment, primarily of elderly workers with work experience. In addition, an
extension of the maximum length of employment under individual fixed-term
contracts from 1–2 or 3 years should be considered.
Retirement rules are characterised by relatively low standard and minimum
retirement age thresholds. Moreover, there are no actuarial penalties for early
retirement, which incentivises pensioners to continue working after retirement,
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particularly in the informal sector. The current retirement age threshold should thus
be increased; in addition, actuarial adjustment of pensions should be introduced to
reflect the life expectancy of people who retire earlier, while actuarial rewards
should apply to those who continue to work and pay pension contributions after
meeting conditions for full retirement, regardless of whether they receive pensions
or not.
In order to support entrepreneurship, specific programmes targeted at reducing
informal employment should be pursued more vigorously and with reference to
experiences of other European countries. Self-employment is supported by the
National Employment Service (NES); this assistance takes the form of a one-off
non-repayable grant and some in-kind support, provided that the beneficiary regu-
larly pays contributions and taxes for at least the following 2 years. On average,
some 3,000–5,000 people per year become self-employed through this programme:
NES staff estimate that most of them merely formalise their informal businesses. It
is interesting to note that evaluations of such ‘legalised’ entrepreneurs show
survival rates greater than for those who started their businesses without previous
experience in the informal sector. Microlending is also a measure that facilitates the
establishment of legal businesses, especially for categories of people who cannot
rely on their own funds or commercial credit, but is as yet virtually non-existent in
Serbia due to an inadequate statutory framework.
Inspection Oversight The Labour and Market Inspectorates are responsible for
tackling informal employment and undeclared and illicit transactions, whilst the
Tax Administration is responsible for preventing tax evasion. In addition to the lack
of equipment and appropriately qualified staff, one of the key problems in the
operation of these institutions is the absence of sufficient co-ordination and inte-
gration with other inspection and oversight services. Closer integration is therefore
required between the various inspectorates, either through an Inspectorate-General,
or, in less demanding form, by means of a co-ordinating body such as a Commis-
sion to Co-Ordinate Inspection Oversight. A framework Inspections Law should be
adopted, harmonised with European Union regulations, to at least ensure better
mutual co-ordination of inspection oversight and to better delimit the powers of the
various inspection services, at the same time closing the loopholes in the powers of
inspection bodies that have made it possible for the shadow economy to flourish and
have hindered the implementation of activities designed to combat it. The advan-
tages of an integrated inspections approach are particularly obvious in the area of
the authority of the Market and Labour Inspectorates. A unified database of
offenders and offences, accessible to all inspection services, the Tax Administra-
tion, the Customs Administration, and the police, would improve the efficiency of
the fight against the shadow economy. The integration of powers would mean that
inspections that uncover an unregistered or unreported entity or person engaging in
an activity under the remit of another inspection would be both authorised and
required to order any deficiencies to be remedied and to notify the Tax Adminis-
tration of the infringement and the measures taken.
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10.2.3 Measures Relating to the Financial Sector
Curb Transactions in Cash and Incentivise Cashless Payments Switching to
cashless (and particularly electronic) payments would reduce the participation of
parties to transactions in the shadow economy. In ensuring this, emphasis should be
placed on incentives that will foster cashless transactions. The use of electronic
money for payment operations can be fostered by allowing electronic payments in
sectors dominated by cash (such as hospitality, taxi cabs, etc.). Other incentives
could include subsidising point-of-sale terminals for small and micro-businesses,
limited tax breaks for electronic payments, and prepaid cards for people without
bank accounts to enable their inclusion in the formal sector. On the macroeconomic
level, government subsidies and assistance could be paid out electronically, as
could various types of contributions. Further, all government payments could be
limited to electronic channels only. To ensure that all remaining cash transactions
take place primarily within formal channels, field audits should be strengthened to
ensure fiscal cash registers are used and receipts are issued for all transactions. A
clear consensus among economic policymakers regarding the application of a
de-euroisation strategy would contribute to a substantial reduction in cash pay-
ments—particularly informal payments—throughout the system.
Reduce the Share of Informal Sources of Finance in the Economy To further
stimulate greater transfers of money through formal channels (and the inflow of
significant funds from abroad in the form of remittances), transfer costs must be
reduced, as was also pointed out by survey respondents. This would increase the
transparency of these flows and make it easier to direct them into investment
contributing to local growth and national development. Greater competition
between formal transfer intermediaries and lower transfer service costs would
increase migrant interest in sending remittances through formal channels, since
these offer numerous benefits to recipients such as easier access to financial
institutions, cheaper finance for the broader public, lower cost of investment due
to more options for diversification, and better education of beneficiaries about
alternate modes of employing funds. Regulatory authorities in sending and receiv-
ing countries should enter into bilateral agreements to formalise and facilitate
transferring, channelling, and registering funds. This process could take the form
of a public-private partnership, with the participation of financial institutions.
Closer co-operation between banking sectors in sending and receiving countries
should lower transaction costs of transfers and accelerate the sending of remittances
through formal channels.
A greater role played by banks in the transfer of remittances should lower transac-
tion costs and increase the speed and reliability of these services. This could also be
achieved by developing a unified clearing system for all countries involved in this
process. Investment using remitted funds could be stimulated by creating a better
climate for investing, as well as by deploying a range of incentives for putting funds
to productive use (e.g., tax breaks). A well-developed infrastructure to support
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channelling money transfers from abroad would also facilitate access to other
financial intermediation services (such as current accounts, savings accounts, and
credit instruments) for a broader section of the population, which would, in turn,
foster the development of the country’s financial sector. Further development of
formal channels for transferring remittances could be harnessed to create innovative
products that would make it possible for migrants to directly invest in their home
countries by purchasing, for instance, land or real estate. Gradual regulation of
sending and receiving remittances would be desirable, so that these flows could be
better studied and this segment of the market developed without excessive and
hasty government intervention, which could retard or disincentivise additional
inflow of these funds.
10.2.4 Measures Related to the Business Environment
Measures related to the business environment are aimed either at business entities
already operating formally or at those wholly in the shadow economy. The existing
regulatory requirements for businesses operating formally need to be simplified and
unnecessary new administrative burdens should be prevented administrative bur-
dens. At between 3.8 and 4.2 % of GDP, Serbia’s administrative costs are among
the highest of all countries that have made similar measurements. Consistent
application of methods such as the SME Test and the Standard Cost Model, as
well as regular stakeholder consultation, could significantly reduce existing admin-
istrative costs, which would foster the shift of some activity from the informal to the
formal sector. There are other areas of the regulatory process that could see major
improvement; in particular, bylaws should be adopted in a timely fashion to reduce
legal uncertainty.
Solving the issues of ‘phoenix companies’ and unfair competition are very
important in tackling the shadow economy. The former would contribute to greater
liquidity, primarily among SMEs, who are often unable to collect receivables from
‘phoenix companies’ and are thus forced to move part of their businesses into the
shadow economy in order to survive. One possible solution would be to set up a
special registry of all bans on operating imposed on managers and owners of
businesses that face criminal or other proceedings. However, what is most needed
to eliminate both ‘phoenix companies’ and unfair competition is greater consis-
tency in applying the existing legal framework.
There are several steps that would facilitate the operation of business entities
wholly in the informal sector and thus promote their integration into the formal
economy. In addition to directly lowering costs by removing barriers to entry in
particular sectors, an electronic registry of legislation accessible to the public free
of charge should be established. Further, existing records should be improved, and a
new e-portal for licences, permits, approvals, and consents should be established.
Integration into the formal sector is also affected by the issue of ‘legalising’
buildings and obtaining construction permits. Unclear and complicated
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‘legalisation’, the subsequent issuance of construction permits for unpermitted
properties–makes entry into the formal sector more difficult, which means that
certain resources are made unavailable for legal transactions and cannot be used by
the economy. In addition to legalisation, entry into the market is hindered by the
very complex construction permit system, which involves filing for permits with a
large number of entities. The resolution of these issues requires a number of
measures to accelerate construction permit procedures, including establishing
‘one-stop shops’ at local authorities, changing the role of public entities in the
permitting procedure, drafting plans in a timely manner, etc.
10.3 Policy Conclusions
The key prerequisites for a successful strategy for formalising the shadow economy
are: (1) to complete the process of transition into a market economy, and (2) to
stabilise the legal and institutional structures of society; these should be followed by
(3) achieving and maintaining macroeconomic stability and (4) creating precondi-
tions for economic growth. The impact of these factors on the shadow economy is
just one among their many desirable effects. The econometric findings presented in
Chap. 6 indicate that an increase in official GDP leads to a drop in the extent of the
shadow economy. In other words, a decline in GDP will increase the shadow
economy as business entities endeavour to compensate for fewer business oppor-
tunities in the formal sector by working in the shadow economy. In these circum-
stances the measures proposed above will not be fully effective.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
170 G. Krstic´ et al.
